Notice to Introduce - Public Procurement Amendment Bill (PMB) (Mr AD Beesley ActionSA)

South Africa has a Public Procurement Act that was signed into law in 2024 (Act No. 28 of 2024). This law sets up the rules for how government buys goods and services, and it includes a 'debarment' framework — a system for blacklisting suppliers who behave dishonestly or break the rules, so they can no longer win government contracts. There is also a body called the Public Procurement Office (PPO) that oversees how government procurement is done across the country.

Separately, South Africa has the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) and the Special Tribunal, which were set up under the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act of 1996. The SIU investigates serious corruption and misuse of state resources, and the Special Tribunal can make legal orders based on those investigations. The problem is that the SIU's findings and the Tribunal's orders do not automatically feed into the debarment system under the 2024 Procurement Act — there is a gap between what these bodies find and whether a supplier actually gets blacklisted. On top of that, government departments (called 'procuring institutions') that are supposed to kick off debarment proceedings sometimes fail to do so, or drag their feet for so long that nothing happens. The 2024 Act does not currently spell out strict timeframes for how quickly debarment cases must be started or finished, which allows delays to go unchecked.

Ordinary South Africans are affected as taxpayers and as people who depend on government services. When corrupt or dishonest suppliers keep getting government contracts — because they were never properly blacklisted — public money gets wasted or stolen, and services like clinics, schools, and roads suffer as a result.

Government departments and other state bodies that buy goods and services (procuring institutions) will be directly affected. They will face new obligations to report on supplier misconduct every year, to start debarment proceedings within set time periods, and to explain themselves if they choose not to pursue debarment against a supplier.

The Public Procurement Office will gain new powers to step in when a government department fails or takes too long to start debarment proceedings. The PPO will also have a new duty to update the public debarment register — the official list of blacklisted suppliers — within a specified time period after a decision is made.

Suppliers and businesses that do work for the government will be affected because the process for being investigated, charged, and blacklisted will become faster and more structured. Dishonest suppliers will find it harder to avoid or delay blacklisting. Honest suppliers benefit too, because a cleaner, faster system means less unfair competition from companies that win contracts through corrupt means.

The Special Investigating Unit and the Special Tribunal will gain a clearer and more direct role in the debarment process, giving legal weight to their findings and orders within the procurement system.

The bill, introduced by ActionSA Member of Parliament Mr Alan David Beesley, proposes to amend the Public Procurement Act of 2024 in several specific ways.

First, it wants to strengthen the debarment framework by giving the Public Procurement Office the power to intervene when a government department either fails to start debarment proceedings against a supplier, or takes an unreasonably long time to do so. Currently, if a department does nothing, there is limited recourse — this bill would change that by allowing the PPO to step in and take over.

Second, the bill proposes to set fixed time periods for when debarment proceedings must be started and when they must be completed. This is meant to stop cases from being delayed indefinitely, whether through bureaucratic slowness or deliberate foot-dragging.

Third, the PPO will be required to update the public debarment register — the list that tells the public and other government bodies which suppliers are blacklisted — within a defined time period after a debarment decision is made. This means the register will be more up to date and reliable.

Fourth, every government department and procuring institution will be required to report to the PPO on an annual basis. These reports must cover supplier misconduct they have encountered, any debarment decisions they have made, and — importantly — any decisions they made not to start debarment proceedings. This creates a paper trail and makes departments accountable for inaction, not just action.

Fifth, and significantly, the bill seeks to connect the work of the Special Investigating Unit and the Special Tribunal directly to the debarment system. When the SIU investigates corruption and makes a recommendation, or when the Special Tribunal issues an order, those findings and orders will now be able to feed directly into the debarment framework under the Procurement Act. The SIU and the Special Tribunal will be given the power to give effect to such recommendations and orders within the debarment system, closing the gap that currently exists between their findings and actual blacklisting of suppliers.

Procurement corruption is one of the biggest drains on South Africa's public finances. Billions of rands are lost every year through dodgy tenders, inflated contracts, and suppliers who deliver substandard work or nothing at all. The debarment system — blacklisting bad suppliers — is supposed to be a key tool for stopping repeat offenders from feeding at the government trough. But if that system moves slowly, or departments can simply choose not to use it, it loses its power as a deterrent.

For ordinary South Africans, this matters because public money wasted on corrupt suppliers is money not spent on hospitals, textbooks, water pipes, and social grants. When the same dodgy contractors keep winning government tenders because they were never properly blacklisted, the people who suffer most are those who depend most on government services.

The link between the SIU and the debarment register is particularly important. The SIU has done extensive work investigating COVID-19 procurement scandals and other corruption, producing detailed findings against specific companies. But if those findings do not automatically result in blacklisting, implicated suppliers can simply move on and bid for more contracts elsewhere in government. This bill would close that loophole.

The annual reporting requirement is also meaningful because it creates transparency and accountability around inaction. Right now, a department that decides to quietly ignore a supplier's misconduct faces no formal obligation to explain that choice. Under this bill, that decision would have to be disclosed and recorded, making it harder for officials to protect connected suppliers without leaving a trace.

If the bill does not pass, the current weaknesses in the debarment system remain in place — slow or no consequences for dishonest suppliers, no intervention mechanism for a sluggish PPO, and a continued disconnect between SIU findings and actual blacklisting. The status quo rewards delay and allows procurement corruption to continue largely unpunished.